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rejected them and have held instead that pension trusts do not qualify as business trusts for the 
purpose of section 109.1  
This memorandum addresses why pension trusts should not be included within the definition 
of a business trust for the purposes of section 109 of the Code pursuant to the frameworks of the 
traditional Morissey test, the substantial business activities test, and the In re Dille Family Trust 
analysis.  
I. Courts Are Divided on How to Define a Business Trust. 
The ability to file a chapter 11 petition for protection under the Bankruptcy Code tuns on 
whether the petitioning party qualifies as a debtor. Thus, how the court defines “business trust” 
can be dispositive on the matter. Indeed, “the decisions are sharply, and perhaps hopelessly, 
divided on the meaning of ‘business trust.’”2  
Section 109 of the Code provides that “only a person … may be a debtor under this title.”3 The 
Code then defines “person,” including under its purview “individual, partnership, and 
corporation.”4 “Corporation” is further defined as including a “business trust.”5 Thus, read together, 
the Code provides debtor protection only for trusts that qualify as business trusts, giving them the 
same protections as a corporation, which are treated as persons for the purpose of the Code.6  
On the other hand, a trust that does not qualify as a business trust is not entitled to debtor 
protection under Chapter 11.7 As opposed to business trusts, other trusts are not persons, but rather 
                                               
1 See In re Cahill, 15 B.R. 639 (E.D. Penn. 1981); Catholic School Employees Pension Trust, 599 B.R. 634 (1st Cir. 
B.A.P. 2019). 
2 In re Medallion Realty Trust, 103 B.R. 8 at 10 (D. Mass. 1989). 
3 11 U.S.C. 109(a). 
4 11 U.S.C. 101(41). 
5 11 U.S.C. 101(9)(a)(v). 
6 See Morrissey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 296 U.S. 344 (1935). 
7 See In re Cahill, 15, B.R. 639 at 640 (“Business trusts have been included in the definition of corporation …. All 
other trusts, however, are ineligible for relief in Chapter 11.”). 
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considered under the definition of “entity,” which, unlike persons, are not entitled to debtor 
protection.  Thus, “except for a ‘business trust’ a trust is not a ‘person’ eligible for relief.”8  
The early courts construing the Code turned to legislative history, which conclusively stated 
that “the definition [of ‘person’] does not include an estate or a trust.”9 So, courts are clear that 
there is a difference between business trusts and other sorts of trusts, but still unclear on what 
exactly this distinction is.  
A. The traditional Morissey Test and its applicability to pension trusts 
The traditional test for determining whether a trust is a business trust emphasizes intent of the 
creators of the trust at inception and the formalities used by the creators. The Supreme Court 
fashioned this test in Morrissey, where the Court distinguished between an “association,” which 
qualifies as a corporation for tax purposes, and a “pure trust,” which does not.10 While factually 
distinct, the analysis undertaken by the Court in Morrissey is relevant to the question at hand. 
There, the government argued that there is a distinction between “business trusts on the one side” 
and “other trusts which are engaged merely in collecting the income and conserving the property 
against the day when it is to be distributed to the beneficiaries,” and that Congress intended to tax 
only business trusts as corporations.11 Further, “[s]uch beneficiaries [to an ordinary trust] do not 
ordinarily …  plan a common effort or enter into a combination for the conduct of a business 
enterprise.”12 In contrast, the object of a “business trust” is “not to hold and conserve particular 
property … but to provide a medium for the conduct of a business and sharing its gains.”13  
                                               
8 In re Medallion, 103 B.R. at 10.  
9 Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 313 (1977); S.Rep No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 
(1978)). 
10 296 U.S. at 347. 
11 Id. at 249 (internal quotations omitted). 
12 Id. at 357. 
13 Id.  
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In distinguishing a business trust from an ordinary trust, Morrissey and its progeny recognized 
5 factors of a business trust: (1) business functions, (2) transferable certificates of beneficial 
interest, (3) centralized management, (4) continuity of life, and (5) limited liability.14 While the 
Morrissey test looks to the use of corporate form in the creation of the trust, the decision should 
not be “pressed so far as to make mere formal procedure a controlling test.”15  
The Eighth Circuit expanded on the Morrissey test, nixing the idea that mere authorization to 
engage in business is sufficient to transform a pure trust into a business trust.16 Faced with an 
organization in which “none of the characteristics of an unincorporated company or association 
[were] present,” the Eighth Circuit in Associated Cemetery Management held that even though the 
trust was “authorized to, and in fact did engage in business,” the lack of any formal conferral of 
authority to engage in business and the lack of corporate-like elements were such that the trust was 
“not transform[ed] … into a ‘business, moneyed or commercial corporation’ or into a ‘person.’”17  
In a short opinion, the court in Cahill followed the rationale of Associated Cemetery 
Management and held that because the pension trust did not “exhibit the required features” of a 
corporation, it was not eligible for debtor status and thus barred from obtaining bankruptcy relief.18 
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania there took a formalistic approach to the question of whether 
a pension trust qualifies for debtor status under the Code.19 
Although some of the elements of the Morrissey test are satisfied, the great weight of the 
examination lands on refusing to classify a pension trust as a business trust. First, a pension trust 
has few, if any, “business functions.” The primary purpose of a pension trust is to “preserve the 
                                               
14 See Medallion Realty Trust, 103 B.R. at 10 (citing Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 359). 
15 296 U.S. at 358.  
16 See Associated Cemetery Management, Inc. v. Barnes, 268 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1959). 
17 Id. at 103-04. 
18 14 B.R. at 640; 170 F.Supp. 298. 
19 Id. 
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res” for the beneficiaries of the pension trust, not to carry on business or make a profit.20 Second, a 
pension trust does not have transferable certificates of beneficial interest like a corporation would, 
in fact pension trusts often prohibit the transferability of beneficial interests.21 While the trust is 
centrally managed by the trustees, the trustees have the ability to terminate the trust.22 Lastly, 
pension trusts generally do limit the liability of the trustees, satisfying the fifth prong of the 
Morrissey test.23 While some of the formalistic requirements of the Morrissey test are met, the lack 
of business functions is fatal to the classification of a pension trust as a business trust. 
B. The substantial business activities test and its applicability to pension trusts 
Another line of cases places less of an emphasis on corporate form, choosing instead to focus 
on the actual behavior of the trust; namely whether the trust’s operations include substantial 
business activities, regardless of the formal procedures used to create the trust. For example, in In 
re Gonic Realty Trust, the trustee had “substantial management powers,” and was “subject to very 
little control by the beneficiaries.”24 Furthermore, the trustee was “conducting a business operation 
relating to the leasing of [properties] to commercial and industrial tenants.”25 Because of the powers 
and freedom of the trustee, along with the businesslike purpose of the trust, the court in that case 
determined that the trust was indeed a business trust and therefore eligible for debtor protection.26 
There, the court looked at the relevant factors as “support [for] the evidentiary conclusion that the 
trust in question was actually operating a business in the commonly accepted meaning of such 
activity” rather than a “definitive list of essential facts to constitute a business trust.”27  
                                               




24 See In re Gonic Realty Trust, 50 B.R. 710, 710 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985). 
25 Id. at 714. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
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Other courts have similarly emphasized the business purpose of a particular trust, regardless 
of form. In a traditional trust, the powers granted to the trustee are merely “incidental to the 
principal purpose of holding and conserving particular property,” while “the powers within a 
business trust are central to its purpose.”28 So, the distinction between business trusts and ordinary 
trusts is that “business trusts are created for the purpose of carrying on some kind of business or 
commercial activity for profit” while “the object of a nonbusiness trust is to protect and preserve 
the trust res.”29 Further, “[i]t is the business trust’s similarity to a corporation that permits it to be a 
debtor in bankruptcy.”30 The court in Treasure Island refused to treat the lack of formalities as 
dispositive on the question of whether the land trust was a business trust.31 Even though the “trust 
instrument itself reject[ed] any construction of it as a business trust,” the court went on to evaluate 
the “economic realities of the situation,” and found the debtor “unable to point to any business 
activity in which it was actively engaged,” and rather found “continuous conduct and assertions to 
the contrary.”32 Thus, refusing to extend the definition of “business trust” to include the land trust 
at issue in Treasure Island ultimately turned on an evaluation of the trust’s “objects and purposes.”33 
Similarly, the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court proposed in Medallion that the simple test 
should ask just “whether the trust was created to transact business for the benefit of investors.”34 
The court there further held that “Congress intended to permit bankruptcy relief for all trusts which 
are created for the purpose of transacting business and whose beneficiaries make a contribution … 
to the enterprise, without regard to whether the trust has characteristics of a corporation.”35 
                                               
28 In re Treasure Island Land Trust, 2 B.R. 332, 334 (M.D. Fla. 1980). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 334-35. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 103 B.R. at 11. 
35 Id. at 11-12.  
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As noted in the cases following Morrissey, for a pension trust to be considered a business trust, 
it must engage in substantial business activities: a pension trust does not. A pension trust is a 
passive trust that is not engaged in the “active management” of funds and investments for the 
purpose of increasing profitability.36 While a pension trust might have a goal of “increas[ing] and 
maximiz[ing] funds,” this does not affect the overall purpose of the trust, which is to preserve the 
assets of the trust for the beneficiary.37 Unlike the trustees in Gonic Realty, who had substantial 
power to transact business and maximize profitability, the trustees of a pension trust are largely 
limited in their abilities, and instead required to preserve trust funds.38  
C. The In re Dille Family Trust analysis and its applicability to pension trusts 
Combining the approaches of the Morrissey line of cases and the “substantial business 
activities” theory, the Western District of Pennsylvania, in In re Dille Family Trust, honed in on 
two crucial questions which, when answered in the affirmative, certify a trust as a business trust.39 
The first question is “whether the trust itself was created for the purpose of transacting a business 
for a profit,” and the second is “whether the trust in-fact has all of the indicia of a corporate entity.”40 
These two questions distill the formal requirements from the Morrissey test, requiring that the trust 
have been created with a business purpose in mind, and the substantive requirements from the 
Gonic court, requiring that the trust actually function with a business purpose.41  
Utilizing the two-question test from In re Dille Family Trust, pension trusts similarly fail to be 
classified as business trusts.42 First, the trust is not created “for the purpose of transacting a business 
for a profit,” because the purpose of a pension trust – delineated in its governing documents – is 
                                               
36 Catholic School Employees Pension Trust, 599 B.R. at 663. 
37 Id. at 666. 
38 Id. at 665-66. 
39 In re Dille Family Trust, 598 B.R. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2019).	
40 Id. at 194. 
41 Id. 
42 598 B.R. 179. 
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generally to preserve the res for the beneficiaries, not to transact business for a profit.43 Further, in 
addressing the formal element of the In re Dille Family Trust test, pension trusts do not have the 
indicia of a corporate entity because neither the governing documents nor the ongoing business of 
a pension trust display the requisite indicia of a corporate entity to be considered a business trust. 
Both the intent and purpose of a business trust is substantially different from that of a corporation, 
and that is reflected in differences between the governing documents.  
CONCLUSION 
Since the primary purpose of a pension trust is to “preserve the res,” and not to maximize 
profitability, pension trusts fail the most important element of a business trust. Further 
supporting the denial of debtor status, pension trusts do not exhibit many of the formalities of a 
corporation and are instead more in line with an ordinary trust. So, pension trusts are not 
considered debtors for the purpose of section 109.  
                                               
43 Id. at 194; See Catholic School Employees Pension Trust, 599 B.R. at 666. 
